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1. Introduction: a manipulation experiment 
 
I shall start from an example that is indeed very effective. Consider the following 
exercise. Take a common A4 sheet, fold it in half along the longer side, and then open 
it up again. Now there will be a fold in the middle of the sheet. Orient the sheet in 
such a way that it looks like a rectangle with its longer side as its base. Hold firm the 
bottom left corner, and grab the bottom right corner, folding it so that it touches the 
middle. Then, grab the bottom left corner, and fold it on the other side of the virtual 
line that the previous fold has created. At this point, a triangle can be recognized: two 
of its sides are already there. To have the last one, it suffices to refold what is left 
outside the area of the triangle so that it will be not visible anymore. The experiment 
has come to its end: there was a rectangle, and now we have a triangle. By 
construction, it is an equilateral triangle. Hence you can turn some rectangle (but 
indeed any rectangle the sides of which are in that proportion) into an equilateral 
triangle. 
 This exercise may sound like a game for children, and to some extent it is. It is 
only one of similar experiments that can be made using a sheet and folding or cutting 
it in order to create and manipulate mathematical figures [3]. Despite its being rather 
unconventional and not 'mathematical' in the narrow sense of the word, this example 
has the advantage of alluding in a striking way at many of the issues the present 
project aims at investigating. The folding procedure is a form of diagrammatic 
reasoning. To clarify, it is possible to transform a rectangle into a triangle if some 
instructions are followed and a very peculiar manipulation is produced by folding the 
sheet. Once this procedure has been properly learned, it can be repeated afterwards 
and it will always succeed, as long as some invariance is assumed (e.g. the shape of 
the initial piece of paper and the proportion between its sides). Moreover, this simple 
transformation involves abilities that have a long cognitive history: in order to obtain 
it, one has first to identify the appropriate visual properties in the scene (e.g. which of 
the side of the sheet are longer, or what is the centre of the sheet); secondly, one has 
to understand the instructions (e.g. one has to know what a rectangle is and what 
'bottom' or 'right' mean); thirdly, one has to perform the appropriate actions (e.g. 
grabbing angles and fold the sheet over yet non existing lines). The operations we 
have made on the piece of paper were driven by the application of different abilities: 
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in being manipulated, the sheet seemed to have connected different cognitive systems 
with the final objective of obtaining a particular result. 
 The general aim of this project is to test what I define as the external connection 
hypothesis (EC in short). In the following section, I will show what this hypothesis is 
about. 
 
2. The external connection hypothesis (EC): diagrams to connect different 
cognitive systems for reasoning purposes 
 
Humans are born with a series of cognitive systems that are ready to work [18], [23], 
and the powers of which augment in the years by learning new practices and new 
cognitive strategies. Unquestionably, these cognitive systems have certain intrinsic 
limits – e.g. humans are finite - and nonetheless, in their evolution and in their history, 
humans have shown an extraordinary capacity in creating tools that would help them 
in the process of describing the world around them and acting upon it. In some cases, 
they have also created tools having an intrinsically cognitive function, which allow 
them to enhance recognition, communicate, economize their cognitive resources, 
provide faster and accurate transitions from premises to conclusions. 
 In recent years, an interest has grown around the phenomenon of non verbal 
thought. One motivation to pursue this study is the observation that it has been non 
verbal thinking, by and large, that has fixed the outlines and filled in the details of our 
material surroundings [7]. Nevertheless, at the beginning of the 20th century, the 
common tendency was to ignore the role of non verbal thought in shaping the world, 
favoring a picture of human reasoning whose paradigm was the simple deduction 
from axioms. In fact, in the past century, a kind of ‘logocentric’ dogma has been 
heavily influential in the intellectual debate. To some extent, this dogma suggested 
also a mechanicistic view of our cognitive functions, according to which the mind 
was analogous to a computing machine and nothing more. Moreover, our 
understanding of scientific and mathematical thought has been heavily shaped by the 
logocentric approach: despite the obvious importance of visual prompts in human 
cognitive activities, visual representation has remained a second-class citizen in both 
its theory and practice [2]. 
 The aim of this project is to provide a theory that deals with the heterogeneity of 
reasoning and the way we were able to increase the powers of our limited mind 
relying on external cognitive tools. Some claims have been put forward about the 
possibility that the mind is extended [6] or embodied [26], or that cognition is 
distributed [13], [14], [15]. Despite their fascination, these metaphors are not enough 
to explain how we have been able - in an evolutionary as well as in an historical 
process - to create such scaffolding structures to reason, and what are the relations 
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between these ‘extensions’ of our minds and our more precocious capacities such as 
vision or motricity. The theory that is needed is a theory that complies with the 
empirical findings about the informational architecture of the brain and at the same 
time avoids such extreme generalizations, offering a framework that would allow for 
the prediction of new phenomena. As human cognitive beings, we spontaneously 
learn and stock in memory information relying on external symbols, pictures, 
sequences of public actions, and these cognitive tools are all inter-operable and not 
directly derived from biological evolution [5]. What grounds our semantical and 
inferential competence with these representations? Why are they so typically human? 
 The ideas behind this project stem from my previous work on diagrammatic 
reasoning. First, it is necessary to be careful in considering the opposition between 
visual and non visual thought, since too much focus on it risks oversimplifying the 
respective features of linguistic items on one side, and diagrams on the other. The 
literature has shown that it is very difficult to give criteria for sharply distinguishing 
between sentential and graphical systems [22]: the analysis of the differences between 
these two formats has obscured the reflection on their analogies. In fact, both 
sentential and graphical systems are tools for reasoning and external representations. 
Moreover, the visual vs. non visual dichotomy is often put forward by scholars who 
accept a dogma that is symmetric to logocentrism, say the ‘visuocentric’ dogma, 
according to which it suffices to look at a diagram and get to its content and to the 
message it conveys: diagrams would directly speak to the eyes. Nevertheless, neither 
compelling arguments nor conclusive empirical evidence are given in favor of this. 
Care must be exerted in comparing the two formats on the score of their relative 
effectiveness [8]. 
 Secondly, diagrams are subject to constraints both as two-dimensional physical 
objects and as objects that require a user to interpret them. Topological relations, for 
example, are very basic spatial relations such as proximity or enclosure that would not 
change in a diagram if the diagram were printed on a rubber sheet and the sheet were 
stretched or twisted [27]. Nevertheless, the recognition of such spatial relationships 
must be accompanied by interpretation, so that the diagram can be used to the aim of 
obtaining new conclusions within a specific theory. To integrate these two kinds of 
constraints, it is possible to refer to the notion of manipulation practice: the correct 
interpretation of a diagram gets intimately connected to the systematic actions that are 
performed on it [9]. 
 I propose to move one step further, and explore what is behind this claim. To 
this aim, I formulate 
 
The external connection hypothesis (EC in short). Three cognitive systems appear to play a 
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role here: the conceptual system, the visuo-spatial system and the motor system. The 
hypothesis is that diagrams have been invented (or discovered) with the function of 
facilitating and organizing our reasoning and are used dynamically. I propose that their use 
engages all of these three systems: the same manipulation of a diagram is seen by the 
conceptual systems as the compliance to some visual invariance, by the visual-spatial system 
as a transformation in time, by the motor system as a movement or a movement plan. 
Dynamically interpreted diagrams work at the interface between these three systems to churn 
out an inference that puts forward a new conclusion. 
 
To better articulate the EC hypothesis that diagrams optimize the interplay of our 
cognitive resources, I will present two lines of research along with their respective 
objectives. The first line, VisuoMotor Recruiting (VmR in short) is aimed at 
evaluating diagrams in relation to other cognitive tools that possibly constitute a 
connection among conceptual, visuo-spatial and motor systems: drawings and 
gestures. The second line, Experiments in Mathematics (ExM in short) is aimed at a 
particular case study - the activity of experimenting in mathematics - where 
theoretical assumptions, hypotheses and the available technology are all engaged. It 
will appear that as diagrams connect different cognitive systems, evolve in history and 
require dedicated learning, their study demands a strongly interdisciplinary effort.  
 
 
3. Two lines of research: VisuoMotor Recruiting (VmR) and Experiments 
in mathematics (ExM) 
 
3.1 VmR: how does a manipulation practice integrate low level and high level 
abilities?  
 
Diagrams are seen as the result of the recruiting of some specific visual routines - and 
possibly motor routines - for reasoning purposes; these visual routines integrate with 
other abilities, such as linguistic competence and reasoning: the result is the choice of 
a particular manipulation. Diagrams will be studied in relation to two other cognitive 
tools that may connect different cognitive systems in order to optimize our cognitive 
resources: (i) the use of technical drawings and (ii) the recourse to gestures. 
 
3.1.1 The use of technical drawings  
In spite of their appearance, technical drawings are not depictive but, like diagrams, 
they are used as inferential or prescriptive tools. An effective technical drawing must 
have the property of ‘good legibility’[19]: this property does not depend upon the 
respect of some mathematical rule, but upon the specifics of biologically and socially 
characterized visual systems of the human users, even when these are assisted by 
artificial processing systems. These constraints long precede the regularization of 
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representational systems such as, say, projections. Furthermore, thanks to these 
constraints, drawings can be used and reproduced. The hypothesis is that diagrams 
are used for acquiring new knowledge only when they can be correctly manipulated. 
Constructional drawings are drawings that are given as tools to calculate and measure. 
As a consequence, they can - and to some extent, must - be adjusted, reconsidered, 
pre-planned. In the study of drawing there has been the tendency to neglect much of 
what today we would call detail drawing, which in the past was marked on the actual 
stone or wood in order to produce an artifact [4]. The shapes of constructional 
drawings may be understood as operations that are not visible in the final product: it is 
because we are able to make the drawing that we can understand the result it designs. 
Until the second half of the 20th century, engineering schools have illustrated the 
understanding of drawings by teaching how to make them: training included 
apprenticeships in which students learnt to appreciate the nature of materials and 
machines through laboratory experience. The knowledge was thus based on sensory 
observations, and masters guided the apprentices showing them what to look for [7]. 
Constructional diagrams invite the user to perform some operation on them. 
 
3.1.2 The recourse to gestures. 
A recent trend of research in psychology tackles the role of gestures in problem 
solving. This study will try to investigate the link between gestures and diagrams. The 
relationship between language and space in the case of some lexical entries such as 
length, width, height and others referring to the flow of time has been already 
investigated: languages all over the world use space metaphorically [16]. The 
hypothesis here is that some form of spatial reasoning constitutes a foundation for 
more abstract reasoning: like language, graphics serve to convey spatial and abstract 
concepts to others in communication and to ourselves in reasoning [25]. What then 
about gestures? 
 Gestures universally accompany spoken language, yet they occur in silent 
thought as well [20]. Some seminal work has been done on the role of gesture in 
solving problems [17]. These problems included spatial arrays and actions, conditions 
known to elicit iconic gestures [10]. Most participants gestured while explaining 
solutions. In contrast, during silent solution, only problems with spatial working 
memory demands elicited gestures from a majority of participants. According to the 
experimenters’ interpretation, these gestures were intended for the gesturer, and were 
produced only when spatial working memory demands were high. Both diagrams and 
gestures augment mind, because they reduce our cognitive loads in working memory, 
and most of all both of them are uniquely human. Presumably, in these cases, a 
gesture serves much like a diagram, in particular to offload working memory.  
6	  	  
 
3.2 ExM: how do mathematicians put together theoretical assumptions 
(interpretation) and hypotheses in the framework of the available technology 
(expressive limits) of the system of symbols used)? 
 
Actual mathematical practice is a key explanandum of any account of reasoning 
through diagrams. This objective implies a relatively new approach to mathematics. 
We grant that mathematics is not an empirical science, but nevertheless, it does not 
follow from this assumption that mathematics has only a deductive dimension. I'll be 
particularly keen on phenomena such as operations on the perceptually available 
representations insofar as they are performed in a creative way that means they are 
intended to bring to new conclusions and discoveries, analogously to what happens by 
experimenting. This study could lead to the individuation of new methods in 
mathematical education to encourage creative processes. To tackle this issue, I will 
discuss in turn (i) a pragmatic approach to mathematics and (ii) the psychology of 
creativity and expertise. 
 
3.2.1 Reinterpreting mathematical activity.  
Mathematicians do not only perform creative experiments to choose the axioms of a 
deductive system, but also to discover and observe new consequences, and be 
surprised by what they find. Deductive reasoning includes an observational element: 
experiments can be used to explore the available conceptual apparatus and its 
expressive limits. According to extreme views such as C. S. Peirce’s [21], 
mathematics is nothing short of an experimental and fallible science. Every 
diagrammatic representation necessarily makes use of a particular system of symbols, 
but if the system is changed in its essential parts, the results obtained transforming 
symbols and diagrams can be very different [12]. An epistemology that works 
properly for mathematics will have to take into account the pragmatic as well as the 
syntactic and semantic features of representation in mathematics: different modes of 
representation bring out different aspects of the items they aim to explain and have 
different degrees of success and accuracy. Such a pragmatic approach studies the use 
of language and other formats in terms of its representational role in an historical 
context of problem-solving [11]. The same set of diagrams can lead to different kinds 
of interpretations and in turn these interpretations can lead to different kinds of 
operations, i.e. to different kinds of manipulations.  
 To sum up, mathematics can be seen as a set of techniques and not as a series of 
propositions: it is the very process of delivering the proof that teaches us what is 
being proved. The analysis of case studies taken from the history of mathematics as 
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well as from contemporary mathematics will be of help in confirming that 
mathematical diagrams are all dynamic, constructional, and involve the coordination 
of several processes and abilities. 
 
3.2.2 Insights from psychology.  
Some seminal studies in psychology have discussed constructive perception, i.e. the 
coordination of two processes: reorganizing perception and associating ideas [24]. 
These processes are correlated independently with a perceptual ability, reorganizing 
parts of figures, that means grouping them in such a way that they can be 
reinterpreted, and with a conceptual ability, associative fluency. The perceptual 
component facilitates perceptually reorganizing what one sees in the external 
environment, enabling detection of subtle features and relations that novices might 
not discern; the conceptual component enables fluency in generating new and related 
thoughts. To keep generating new ideas in a domain these two components must be 
tightly coordinated. Beside the individuation of other empirical scenarios, it will be 
interesting in this respect to analyze the educational software actually available to 
teach mathematics, logic and geometry. Does this kind of constructive perception get 
nurtured by using them? 
 Expertise is thus attained by coming to differentiate and reorganize parts, 
wholes, perspectives, and reference frames. Perceptual expertise must then be 
coordinated with behavior. The implication is that expertise is not acquired 
straightforwardly by teaching, but rather by a coordinated act of perceiving new 
features and relations previously unheeded, conceiving of new and associated 
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